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Abstract
Principia Logico-Metaphysica contains a foundational logical
theory for metaphysics, mathematics, and the sciences. It includes
a canonical development of Abstract Object Theory [AOT], a meta-
physical theory (inspired by ideas of Ernst Mally, formalized by
Zalta) that distinguishes between ordinary and abstract objects.
This article reports on recent work in which AOT has been suc-
cessfully represented and partly automated in the proof assistant
∗Copyright c© 2019, by the authors. This paper is forthcoming at the Review of
Symbolic Logic.
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system Isabelle/HOL. Initial experiments within this framework
reveal a crucial but overlooked fact: a deeply-rooted and known
paradox is reintroduced in AOT when the logic of complex terms
is simply adjoined to AOT’s specially formulated comprehension
principle for relations. This result constitutes a new and impor-
tant paradox, given how much expressive and analytic power is
contributed by having the two kinds of complex terms in the sys-
tem. Its discovery is the highlight of our joint project and provides
strong evidence for a new kind of scientific practice in philosophy,
namely, computational metaphysics.
Our results were made technically possible by a suitable adap-
tation of Benzmüller’s metalogical approach to universal reason-
ing by semantically embedding theories in classical higher-order
logic. This approach enables one to reuse state-of-the-art higher-
order proof assistants, such as Isabelle/HOL, for mechanizing and
experimentally exploring challenging logics and theories such as
AOT. Our results also provide a fresh perspective on the question
of whether relational type theory or functional type theory better
serves as a foundation for logic and metaphysics.
1 Abstract Summary
Principia Logico-Metaphysica (PLM) [16] is an online research monograph
that contains a canonical presentation of Abstract Object Theory (AOT)
[17], [18], along with motivation for, and commentary on, the theory.
AOT is a foundational logical theory for metaphysics, mathematics and
the sciences. It distinguishes between abstract and ordinary objects, by
regimenting a distinction found in the work of the philosopher Ernst Mally
[7] (though the distinction has appeared in other philosophical works).
AOT is outlined in §2. It systematizes two fundamental kinds of pred-
ication: classical exemplification for ordinary and abstract objects, and
encoding for abstract objects. The latter is a new kind of predication that
provides AOT with expressive power beyond that of quantified second-
order modal logic, and this enables one to formalize various metaphysical
theories about different abstract objects, including the objects presup-
posed by mathematics and the sciences. More generally, the system offers
a universal logical theory that may have a greater capability of accurately
representing the contents of human thought than other foundational sys-
tems.
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3 Mechanizing Principia Logico-Metaphysica
Independently, the use of shallow semantical embeddings (SSEs) of
complex logical systems in classical higher-order logic (HOL) has consis-
tently shown potential as a metalogical approach towards universal logical
reasoning [1]. The SSE approach aims to unify logical reasoning by us-
ing HOL as a universal metalogic. Only the distinctive primitives of a
target logic are defined in the metalogic in terms of their semantic in-
terpretations, whereas the rest of the target system is captured by the
existing infrastructure of HOL. This is why it is a shallow semantical
embedding. For example, quantified modal logic can be encoded by rep-
resenting propositions as sets of possible worlds and by representing the
connectives, quantifiers, and modal operators as operations on those sets.
In this way, the world-dependency of Kripke-style semantics can easily
be modeled in HOL. Utilizing the variety of options for handling and
hiding such definitions that are offered in modern proof assistants such
as Isabelle/HOL [12], a human-friendly mechanization of even the most
challenging target logics, including AOT, can thus be obtained.
AOT and the SSE approach are rather orthogonal. They have very
different motivations and come with fundamentally different foundational
assumptions. AOT uses a hyperintensional second-order modal logic,
grounded on a relational type theory, as its foundation. It is in the tradi-
tion of Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica [14], [10] which
takes the notion of relation as primitive and defines the notion of func-
tion in terms of relations. Relations, on this approach, are assumed to be
hyperintensional unless one explicitly asserts, of a given n-place relation
R, that it is extensional by adding an axiom that guarantees that any
n-place relation necessarily equivalent to R is identical to it, i.e., that
∀S(∀x1 . . . ∀xn(Sx1 . . . xn ≡ Rx1 . . . xn)→ S=R). The metalogic HOL
in the SSE approach, by contrast, is fully extensional, and is defined on
top of a functional type theory in the tradition of the work of Frege [6]
and Church [4]. It takes the notion of (fully extensional) function as
primitive and defines the notion of relation in terms of functions.1 These
fundamentally different and, to some extent, antagonistic roots impose
different requirements on the corresponding frameworks, in particular,
with regard to the comprehension principles that assert the existence of
relations and functions. Devising a mapping between the two formalisms
1In principle, functional type theory can be developed intensionally [11], but Isa-
belle/HOL and other automated proof assistants are based on extensional functional
type theory for a reason, namely, to make the system computationally tractable.
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is, unsurprisingly, a non-trivial, practical challenge [13].
The work reported here tackles this challenge. Further details can be
found in Kirchner’s M.A. thesis [8], where the SSE approach is utilized to
mechanize and analyze AOT in HOL. Kirchner constructed a shallow se-
mantical embedding of the second-order modal fragment of AOT in HOL,
and this embedding was subsequently represented in the proof assistant
system Isabelle/HOL (see §4). The proof assistant system enables one to
conduct experiments in the spirit of a computational metaphysics, with
results that have helped to advance the ideas of AOT.
The inspiration for Kirchner’s embedding comes from the model for
AOT proposed by Peter Aczel.2 Kirchner adapted techniques used in
Benzmüller’s initial attempts to embed AOT in Isabelle/HOL. An impor-
tant goal of the research was to avoid artifactual theorems, i.e., theorems
that (a) are derivable on the basis of special facts about the Aczel model
that was used to embed AOT in Isabelle/HOL, but (b) aren’t theorems of
AOT.3 An example of an artifactual theorem can be seen in Figure 6 and,
since AOT is, in part, a body of theorems, care has been taken not to
derive artifactual theorems about the Aczel model that are not theorems
of AOT itself.
This explains why the embedding of AOT in Isabelle/HOL involves
several layers of abstraction. In the Aczel model of AOT that serves
as a starting point, abstract objects are modeled as sets of properties,
where properties are themselves modeled as sets of urelements. Once the
axioms of AOT are derived from the shallow semantical embedding of
AOT in HOL, a controlled, and suitably restricted, logic layer is defined.
By reconstructing the inference principles of AOT in the system that
derives the axioms of AOT, only the theorems of AOT become derivable.
If we utilize Isabelle/HOL’s sophisticated support tools for interactive
and automated proof development at this highest level of the embedding,
it becomes straightforward to map the pen and paper proofs of PLM
into corresponding, intuitive, and user-friendly proofs in Isabelle/HOL. In
nearly all cases this mapping is roughly one-to-one, and in several cases
the computer proofs are even shorter. In other words, the de Bruijn factor
2An earlier model for AOT was proposed by Dana Scott. His model is equivalent
to a special case of an Aczel model with only one special urelement. See below for a
discussion of the Aczel model.
3We have not yet investigated the question of whether the embedding of AOT in
HOL is complete in the sense that if the representation of φ is provable in HOL, then
φ is provable in AOT. However, this will be a topic of future research.
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[15] of this work is close to 1. In addition, the layered construction of the
embedding has yielded a detailed, experimental analysis in Isabelle/HOL
of the underlying Aczel model and the semantic properties of AOT.
As an unexpected, but key result of this experimental study, it was dis-
covered that if a classical logic for complex terms such as λ-expressions and
definite descriptions is adjoined, without taking any special precautions,
to AOT’s specially-formulated comprehension principle for relations, a
known paradox that had been successfully put to rest is reintroduced
(see §5). Since the complex terms add significant expressive and analytic
power to AOT, and play a role in many of its more interesting theorems
and applications, the re-emergence of the known paradox has become a
new paradox that has to be addressed. In the ongoing attempts to find an
elegant formulation of AOT that avoids the new paradox, the computa-
tional representation in Isabelle/HOL now provides a testing infrastruc-
ture and serves as an invaluable aid for analyzing various conjectures and
hypothetical solutions to the problem. This illustrates the very idea of
computational metaphysics: humans and machines team up and split the
tedious work in proportion to their cognitive and computational strengths
and competencies. And, as intended, the results we achieved reconfirm
the practical relevance of the SSE approach to universal logical reasoning.
Though the details of the embedding of AOT in Isabelle/HOL are
developed in Kirchner [8], we discuss the core aspects of this work in the
remainder of this article.
2 The Theory of Abstract Objects
The language of second-order AOT uses individual variables x, y, . . . and
n-place relation variables Fn, Gn, . . . (n ≥ 0). The sentences of the lan-
guage are built up from two kinds of atomic formulas: classical exempli-
fication formulas of the form F 1x (or more generally, Fnx1 . . . xn) and
encoding formulas of the form xF 1.4 A distinguished predicate is then
used to define a distinction between objects that exemplify being abstract
4It is important to emphasize that the two kinds of atomic formulas are typed
in the sense that, in both kinds of formulas, no individual term can stand in relation
position and no relation term can stand in individual position. In the embedding of this
language in functional type theory both kinds of formulas are given a special functional
semantics that is distinct from the fundamental notion of function application in HOL.
Details of this semantics can be found in §4.
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(A!x) and objects that exemplify being ordinary (O!x). Whereas ordinary
objects are characterized only by the properties they exemplify, abstract
objects may be characterized by both the properties they exemplify and
the properties they encode. But only the latter play a role in their iden-
tity conditions: A!x & A!y → (x = y ≡ ∀F (xF ≡ yF )), i.e, abstract
objects are identical if and only if they necessarily encode the same prop-
erties. The identity for ordinary objects on the other hand is classical:
O!x & O!y → (x= y ≡ ∀F (Fx ≡ Fy)), i.e., ordinary objects x and y
are identical if and only if they necessarily exemplify the same properties.
It is axiomatic that ordinary objects necessarily fail to encode properties
(O!x→ ¬∃FxF ), and so only abstract objects can be the subject of true
encoding predications. For example, whereas Pinkerton (a real American
detective) exemplifies being a detective and all his other properties (and
doesn’t encode any properties), Sherlock Holmes encodes being a detective
(and all the other properties attributed to him in the novels), but doesn’t
exemplify being a detective. Holmes, on the other hand, intuitively exem-
plifies being a fictional character (but doesn’t encode this property) and
exemplifies any property necessarily implied by being abstract (e.g., he
exemplifies not having a mass, not having a shape, etc.).5
The key axiom of AOT is the comprehension principle for abstract ob-
jects. It asserts, for every condition on properties (i.e., for every express-
ible set of properties), that there exists an abstract object that encodes
exactly the properties that satisfy the condition; formally:
∃x(A!x & ∀F (xF ≡ φ)),
where φ is any condition on F in which x doesn’t occur free. Therefore,
abstract objects can be modeled as elements of the power set of properties:
every abstract object uniquely corresponds to a specific set of properties.
Given this basic theory of abstract objects, AOT can define a wide va-
riety of objects that have been postulated in philosophy or presupposed in
the sciences, including truth-values, Leibnizian concepts, Platonic forms,
possible worlds, natural numbers, and logically-defined sets.
Another interesting aspect of the theory is its hyperintensionality. Re-
lation identity is defined in terms of encoding rather than in terms of
exemplification. Two properties F and G are stipulated to be identical
5He encodes having a mass, having a shape, etc., since these are properties at-
tributed to him, at least implicitly, in the story. As an abstract object, however, he
does not exemplify these properties, and so exemplifies their negations.
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if they are necessarily encoded by the same abstract objects (F = G ≡
∀x(xF ≡ xG)). However, the theory does not impose any restrictions
on the properties encoded by a particular abstract object. For exam-
ple, the fact that an abstract object encodes the property [λxFx & Gx]
does not imply that it also encodes either the property F , or G or even
[λxGx & Fx] (which, although extensionally equivalent to [λxFx & Gx],
is a distinct intensional entity).
Therefore, without additional axioms, pairs of materially equivalent
properties (in the exemplification sense), and even necessarily equivalent
properties, are not forced to be identical. This is a key aspect of the
theory that makes it possible to represent the contents of human thought
much more accurately than classical exemplification logic would allow.
For instance, the properties being a creature with a heart and being a
creature with a kidney may be regarded as distinct properties despite the
fact that they are extensionally equivalent. And being a barber who shaves
all and only those persons who don’t shave themselves and being a set of all
those sets that aren’t members of themselves may be regarded as distinct
properties, although they are necessarily equivalent (both necessarily fail
to be exemplified).
A full description of the theory goes beyond the scope of this article,
but detailed descriptions are available in two books [17], [18] and various
articless by Zalta. A regularly updated, online monograph titled Principia
Logico-Metaphysica [16] contains the latest formulation of the theory and
serves to compile, in one location, both new theorems and theorems from
many of the published books and articless. The mechanization described
below follows the presentation of AOT in a recent version of PLM, but is
still being adapted as research continues and PLM evolves.
The complexity and versatility of AOT, as well as its philosophical
ambitions, make it an ideal candidate to test the universality of the SSE
approach. However, recent work [13] has posed a challenge for any em-
bedding of AOT in functional type theory. In the next section, we briefly
discuss this challenge.
3 AOT in Functional Logic
Russell’s well-known paradox in naive set theory arises by (a) considering
the set of all sets that don’t contain themselves, and (b) noting that
this set contains itself if and only if it doesn’t. A similar construction
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(‘the Clark-Boolos paradox’) is possible in naive versions of AOT: assume
that the term [λx ∃F (xF &¬Fx)] denotes a property, namely, being an
x that encodes a property that x does not exemplify; call it K. The
comprehension axiom for abstract objects then ensures that there is an
abstract object that encodes K and no other properties. This abstract
object then exemplifies K if and only if it does not, and so involves one
in a paradox.6 See [3] for details about the paradox; it was first described
by Clark [5] and reconstructed independently by Boolos [2].
AOT undermined the paradox by restricting the matrix of λ-expressions
to so-called propositional formulas, that is, to formulas without encod-
ing subformulas. This way, the term [λx ∃F (xF &¬Fx)] is no longer
well formed and the construction of the paradox fails. Thus, AOT con-
tained formulas, e.g., ∃F (xF &¬Fx), that may not be placed within a
λ-expression or otherwise converted to a term.7
Whereas relational type theory allows one to have formulas that can-
not be converted to terms, functional type theory does not; in functional
type theory, it is assumed that every formula can be converted to a term.
That is crucial to the analysis of the universal quantifier. The binding
operator ∀x in a formula of the form ∀xφ is represented, in functional
type theory, as a function that maps the property [λx φ] to a truth value,
namely, the function that maps [λx φ] to The True just in case every
object y in the domain is such that [λx φ](y) holds. So in order to repre-
sent quantified AOT formulas that contain encoding subformulas, such as
∀x∃F (xF &¬Fx), their matrices have to be convertible to terms.8 But,
as we’ve seen, if [λx ∃F (xF & ¬Fx)] were a term subject to β-conversion,
6Let a be the abstract object guaranteed by object comprehension, so that we know:
(ϑ) ∀F (aF ≡ F =K)
Now suppose, for reductio, Ka. Then by β-conversion, there is a property, say P ,
such that aP &¬Pa. Since aP , it follows by (ϑ) that P =K. So from ¬Pa it follows
that ¬Ka, which contradicts our reductio hypothesis. So suppose ¬Ka. Then by β-
conversion and predicate logic, ∀F (aF → Fa). Now since K=K, it follows from (ϑ)
that aK. Hence Ka. Contradiction.
7In the very latest versions of PLM, AOT’s free logic has been extended to cover λ-
expressions, and so [λx ∃F (xF &¬Fx)] is now treated as well formed but non-denoting.
This latest development is briefly discussed in [9].
8Note that ∀x∃F (xF &¬Fx) is a well-formed formula of the system, but in fact
false. For example, it fails when x is ordinary, and when x is the abstract object that
encodes no properties. However, the negation of this formula is true, and our question
is how to interpret the embedded quantifier in functional type theory.
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AOT would yield a contradiction.9
Thus, it is not trivial to devise a semantical embedding that supports
AOT’s distinction between formulas and propositional formulas, but at
the same time preserves a general theory of quantification. Another chal-
lenge has been to accurately represent the hyperintensionality of AOT:
while relations in AOT are hyperintensional (i.e., necessarily equivalent
relations may be distinct), functions (and relations) in HOL are fully ex-
tensional, and can not be used to represent the relations of AOT directly.
4 Embedding AOT in Isabelle/HOL
The embedding of AOT in Isabelle/HOL overcomes these issues by con-
structing a modal, hyperintensional variant of the Aczel-model of AOT.
Modality is represented by introducing a dependency on primitive possi-
ble worlds in the manner of Kripke semantics of modal logic. Hyperinten-
sionality is achieved by an additional dependency on a separate domain of
primitive states. Consequently, propositions are represented as Boolean-
valued functions acting on states and possible worlds. The model begins
with a domain partitioned into ordinary and special urelements (this cor-
responds to the domain U in Figure 1). Whereas the Aczel model rep-
resents properties as sets of urelements, properties in our embedding are
represented as functions mapping urelements to propositions. The ordi-
nary objects of AOT are then represented by ordinary urelements, and
the abstract objects of AOT are represented as sets of properties. These
sets are assigned a proxy among the special urelements (and given that
there are more sets of properties than urelements, some abstract objects
will be assigned the same proxy).10
9Readers familiar with Isabelle/HOL might find this notation confusing. In AOT,
the symbol φ is a metavariable that ranges over formulas which may contain free oc-
currences of x that can be bound by a binding operator. In Isabelle/HOL, however,
a formula with a free variable would be represented as a function from individuals
to truth-values, and the quantified formula would be written as ∀x. φ x. Such a for-
mula is true, if φ x, i.e., the function application of φ to x holds for all x in the
domain. In this scenario it is true that φ = (λx. φ x). Consequently the primitive,
functional λ-expressions of Isabelle/HOL cannot be used to represent the λ-expressions
of AOT, since the λ-expressions of Isabelle/HOL cannot simultaneously exclude non-
propositional formulas while allowing quantified formulas with encoding subformulas.
10The problem that Aczel solves in the model is this: if abstract objects are rep-
resented as sets of properties, then how are we to understand the fact that in object
theory, there is an object x and property F such that both xF and Fx? The encoding
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Domain D = A ∪C
U = Urelements =
Define a mapping:
‖a‖ : A→ S
C S
P = Properties = ℘(U)
A = Abstract Objects = ℘(P)
Figure 1: Extensional, non-modal Aczel model of AOT.
From this description, it becomes clear that if x is an ordinary object,
then the truth conditions of an exemplification formula Px are captured
by the proposition that is the result of applying the function represent-
ing the property P to the ordinary urelement representing x. If x is an
abstract object, then the truth conditions of an exemplification formula
Px are captured by the proposition that is the result of applying the
function representing the property P to the special urelement that serves
as the proxy of x. An encoding formula xP , by contrast, is true just in
case x is an abstract object and the property P is an element of the set
of properties representing x. This latter feature of the model validates
the comprehension axiom for abstract objects: for every set of properties,
there exists a unique abstract object that encodes exactly those prop-
claim, xF , is easy: in the model, this is true if F ∈ x. However, how can a set of
properties exemplify a property that is an element of it? We cannot model Fx as
x ∈ F without a violation of the foundation axiom. Interestingly, Aczel chose not to
use nonwellfounded sets for his model. Instead he mapped abstract objects, modeled
as sets of properties, to proxies in the domain of special urelements and set the truth
conditions for Fx to the following disjunctive condition: x ∈ F if x is ordinary and
‖x‖ ∈ F (i.e., the proxy of x is an element of F ), if x is abstract. We have extended
Aczel’s model with modality and hyperintensionality.
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erties. Figure 2 shows the representation of 1-place exemplification and
encoding in Isabelle/HOL.
Figure 2: Definition of 1-place exemplification and encoding in Isa-
belle/HOL.
In the definition of 1-place exemplification, which starts on the first
line, exe1 is defined as a function of type Π1 ⇒ κ ⇒ o that maps 1-
place relation terms (of type Π1) and individual terms (of type κ) to
propositions (type o). This function then becomes represented as a 4-
argument function that maps properties, individuals, states, and worlds
to a Boolean (this function, in turn, is defined by means of proper, rep
and the νυ mappings).11 In the definition of encoding, enc is defined as
a function of type κ⇒ Π1⇒ o that maps individual terms and 1-place
relation terms to propositions. This function then becomes represented
as a 4-argument function that maps individuals, properties, states, and
worlds to a Boolean (this function, in turn, is defined by means of proper,
rep and a case distinction on types case_ν).12
Since well-formed λ-expressions in AOT were required to have a propo-
sitional matrix, such expressions correspond to functions on urelements.
Given that encoding subformulas were excluded from these expressions in
AOT, the only formulas that can occur in the matrix of a λ-expression
are those built up from exemplification formulas. The truth conditions
of these formulas are determined solely by the properties and relations of
11Here proper x is true, if x denotes an individual (x can also be a non-denoting
definite description), rep x is the individual denoted by x (given that x denotes), and
νυ is the mapping from individuals to urelements. As a result, the exemplification
function maps a property term and an individual term to a proposition that is true in
a given intensional state and possible world if and only if the individual term denotes
and the property denoted by the property term maps the triple consisting of the
urelement corresponding to the denoted individual, the given intensional state, and
the given possible world, to The True. For a full description of all types, symbols and
concepts involved, refer to [8].
12The second conjunct in the definition evaluates to False, if rep x is an ordinary
object; if rep x is an abstract object, the conjunct is true if and only if the property F
is contained in the abstract object.
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the urelements in the model.13
Consequently, the λ-expressions of AOT are not represented using the
unrestricted primitive λ-expressions of HOL, but have a more complex
semantic representation which is captured by the definition of a new class
of λ-expressions in Isabelle/HOL that will represent AOT λ-expressions;
the definition for the 1-place case is given in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Definition of AOT’s λ-expressions in Isabelle/HOL.
It may help to explain the definition of lambdabinder1 in Figure 3.
lambdabinder1 is defined as a function of type (ν ⇒ o)⇒ Π1, which maps
functions-from-individuals-to-propositions to 1-place relation terms. The
function ϕ is mapped to a 1-place relation term, which is in turn repre-
sented as a Boolean-valued ternary function on urelements u, states s,
and worlds w. This function evaluates to true if there exists an individual
x such that both x is mapped to the urelement u under the mapping νυ
and the function ϕ evaluates, for x, to a proposition true in s and w.
Thus, non-well-formed λ-expressions of AOT, which can’t be syntac-
tically excluded from the SSE representation, are given a nonstandard
semantics and this avoids, modulo the discussion below, the Clark-Boolos
paradox. As a result, β-conversion for the defined λ-expressions holds in
general for terms that were syntactically well-formed in AOT, whereas for
terms that were not syntactically well-formed in AOT (but which are still
part of the SSE), β-conversion is not derivable.
The model structure we’ve just described can represent all the terms
of the target logic and can preserve hyperintensionality. Moreover, the ax-
ioms and inference rules of AOT become derivable. Thus, the embedding
makes it possible to introduce additional layers of abstraction. Given the
model structure, the first layer of abstraction is the representation of the
formal semantics of PLM. This, in turn, becomes the basis of the second
layer of abstraction, namely, the derived axioms and the fundamental in-
ference rules of PLM. The second abstraction layer consists solely of the
axioms and rules of PLM itself and makes it possible to reason directly
13It turns out that in the October 28, 2016 version of PLM, there was an exception
to this rule that led to the reintroduction of the Clark-Boolos paradox. We’ll discuss
this in a subsequent section.
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in the target logic but independently of the underlying model structure.
Thus, the second layer of abstraction avoids the derivation of artifactual
theorems; the fact that the model structure validates formulas that aren’t
theorems of AOT is of no further consequence. And, just as importantly,
the model guarantees that the system of AOT is sound.
These results are illustrated in the following figures. In Figure 4, we
show the derivation of some axioms; in Figure 5, we show the derivation
of the ♦ version of the Barcan formula; and in Figure 6, we show that the
derivation of the artifactual theorem xF ↔ F ∈ x requires one to unfold
the semantic definitions (this is revealed by the second line).
Figure 4: Some of the axioms of AOT, derived automatically in Isa-
belle/HOL.
Furthermore, there are other advantages to our methodology. For
one thing, it is straightforward to convert statements derived within Isa-
belle/HOL into traditional pen and paper proofs for AOT. Thus, our
approach facilitates experimental studies within the computational imple-
mentation and informs discussions about them. Moreover, the approach
is suitable for conducting a deeper analysis of AOT and its model struc-
ture. The analysis led to the discovery of how a previously-known paradox
could easily resurface if care isn’t taken in the formulation of PLM. This
paradox will be sketched in the next section.
5 Reintroduction of a Paradox
As explained in the previous section, our goal was to ensure that all of
the λ-expressions of the embedding that conformed to AOT’s syntactic
restrictions have a standard semantics. We wanted β-conversion to govern
all λ-expressions with a propositional matrix.
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Figure 5: Reasoning in the abstract layer in Isabelle/HOL. Only theorems
and rules of AOT are used in derivations.
Figure 6: Artifactual theorems are provable only by expanding the met-
alogical definitions.
However, as we analyzed our work, it became apparent that in the
working version of PLM that served as the basis of our investigations,
certain λ-expressions involving definite descriptions did not exhibit the
desired behavior in the embedding. These were definite descriptions con-
taining a free occurrence of a variable that becomes bound by a λ-binder.
We could not verify that β-conversion was derivable for those expressions.
Using the infrastructure provided by Isabelle/HOL, it became possible to
show that β-conversion for these terms does not hold generally in an Aczel
model and this suggested that there might be some problem with these
expressions.
Consequently, we focused our attention on the assumption that β-
conversion holds for such terms in Isabelle/HOL. This assumption turned
out to be inconsistent; the layered structure of the embedding made it pos-
sible to construct a proof of the inconsistency using object-level reasoning
at the highest level of abstraction. This way, a human-friendly proof of
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the paradox was reconstructed and quickly confirmed. It became appar-
ent that the logic of λ-expressions and definite descriptions combined to
circumvent the restriction that encoding subformulas not be allowed in
λ-expressions. Indeed, the paradox turned out to be one that was previ-
ously known (namely, the Clark-Boolos paradox mentioned earlier), but
which had re-emerged through the back door (see the discussion below).
This new route to a previously-known paradox constituted a new paradox.
The new paradox is due in part to the precise definition of subformula.
The matrix of a λ-expression in AOT was allowed to contain encoding
formulas as long as they were nested within a definite description. En-
coding formulas so nested were not considered subformulas of the matrix
and so such matrices were still considered propositional formulas. There-
fore, the term [λx Gιyψ] was considered well formed even if ψ contained
encoding subformulas. By choosing G to be a property that is universally
true (e.g. [λz ∀p(p→ p)]) and letting ψ be y = x& ∃F (xF & ¬Fx), one
could construct a property that is extensionally equivalent to the prop-
erty K described above in Section 3. This was sufficient to reconstruct
the Clark-Boolos paradox.
More specifically, to see how the Clark-Boolos paradox was reintro-
duced, suppose that the following λ-expression denotes a property, for
any choice of G:
[λx Gıy(y=x& ∃F (xF & ¬Fx))]
Then if G is a universal property such that ∀xGx, it can be shown that
Gıy(y=x& ∃F (xF & ¬Fx)) ≡ ∃!y(y=x& ∃F (xF & ¬Fx))
≡ ∃F (xF & ¬Fx)
We leave the proof as an exercise. So the matrix Gıy(y=x & ∃F (xF &
¬Fx)) is equivalent to ∃F (xF & ¬Fx), when G is a universal property.
Although the λ-expression built from the latter matrix was banished from
AOT, a λ-expression built from the former matrix would just as easily lead
to the Clark-Boolos paradox.
The discovery of the reemergence of the Clark-Boolos paradox has led
to some new developments in AOT. There has been a modest revision
of the axioms of AOT which avoids the paradox (without sacrificing any
important theorems). Indeed, as mentioned earlier in Footnote 7, AOT
now allows encoding subformulas in λ-expressions, but its free logic en-
sures that only the safe ones denote properties. These developments also
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led to a new definition of logical existence for terms, i.e., the fact that a
term has a denotation and is thus significant. Typically, in free logic, one
defines the logical existence of a term (represented as τ↓) as ∃β(β = τ).
Object theory had followed this pattern for individual terms. Now, logical
existence is (a) defined using exemplification predication instead of using
identity for individual terms and (b) also defined for relation terms, this
time using encoding predication. These new developments of AOT and
its embedding are briefly discussed in [9].
6 Final Considerations
The complexity of the target system and the multiple abstraction layers
presents a challenge for the development and use of automated reasoning
tools. Normally, one would automate proofs of any embedded theory by
using Isabelle/HOL’s inbuilt reasoning tools (e.g., Sledgehammer and Nit-
pick) to unfold the semantical definitions used to represent the theory in
HOL. But, in the case of PLM, a better option is to directly automate the
proof theory as an abstraction layer, i.e., without unfolding the semantical
definitions. We had two reasons for adopting this latter option: it easily
avoids the problem of generating artifactual theorems and it allows for the
interactive construction of complex, but human-friendly, proofs for PLM.
To simplify the implementation of this option, we used the Eisbach pack-
age of Isabelle to define proof methods for the system PLM, including a
resolution prover that can automatically derive the classical propositional
tautologies directly in AOT.
One interesting problem that has not yet been resolved is the one
identified in Oppenheimer & Zalta [13]. As noted in Section 3, AOT
has formulas that can’t be converted to denoting terms and this makes
it difficult to give a general representation of AOT in functional type
theory. Oppenheimer & Zalta concluded from this that relational type
theory is more fundamental than functional type theory. But though the
SSE embedding of AOT in Isabelle/HOL doesn’t challenge this conclu-
sion directly, it does show that the functional setting of HOL can offer a
reasonably accurate representation of the reasoning that can be done in
AOT. This approach addresses, at least in part, Oppenheimer & Zalta’s
claim, though we haven’t yet addressed whether functional type theory,
in the absence of abstraction layers, can generally represent systems of
relational type theory in which not every formula can be converted to a
17 Mechanizing Principia Logico-Metaphysica
denoting term.
We’ve discovered that the key to the development of a sound axiom-
atization of the complex relation terms of AOT is to be found in the
study of, and solution to, the representation of λ-expressions. With a
paradox-free emendation of AOT, current research is directed to giving
an extended analysis of the faithfulness of the embedding approach we
used; this would shed further light on the debate about relational and
functional type theory. This study should be complemented by an anal-
ysis of the reverse direction, i.e., an embedding of the fundamental logic
of HOL in the (relational) type-theoretic version of AOT. Both studies
should then be carefully assessed.
In conclusion, the semantical embedding approach has been fruitfully
employed to encode the logic of AOT in Isabelle/HOL. By devising and
utilizing a multi-layered approach (which at the most abstract level di-
rectly mechanizes the proof-theoretic system of AOT), the issues arising
for an embedding in classical higher-order logic are not too difficult to
overcome. A highly complex target system based on a fundamentally dif-
ferent tradition of logical reasoning (relational instead of functional logic)
has been represented and analyzed using the approach of shallow seman-
tical embeddings. The power of this approach has been demonstrated by
the discovery of a previously unnoticed paradox that was latent in AOT.
Furthermore, the work contributes to the philosophical debate about the
tension between functional type theory and relational type theory and
their inter-representability, and it clearly demonstrates the merits of shal-
low semantical embeddings as a means towards universal logical reasoning.
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